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THE  PRIVATE  RIGHTS  OF  PUBLIC  GOVERNMENTS
Seth Davis*
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts law is replete with hallowed dictums that are figuratively
resonant but literally false.  Among these is Marbury v. Madison’s admonition
that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individu-
als.”1  Taken literally, this dictum would close the courthouse doors to gov-
ernment plaintiffs, not to mention any plaintiff who sues to enforce the
rights of the public.  Perhaps federal courts should take Marbury’s dictum for
all it literally says, but they do not, not really.  Understood figuratively, how-
ever, Marbury might be read to enshrine a private rights model into the law of
federal jurisdiction.2
Contemporary standing doctrine reflects the private rights model.
Standing, the Supreme Court has held, is “an essential and unchanging part
of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”3  Under the private
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1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
2 Cf. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring in result) (arguing that Article III requires harm to private rights
before federal court may take jurisdiction, and citing Marbury’s dictum for that proposi-
tion); Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to
the Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1384
(2014) (“By enforcing the private-rights model articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury, Article III standing can effectively prevent what Tocqueville called ‘wanton
assaults’ on legislation resulting from ‘the daily aggressions of party spirit.’” (quoting 1
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (P. Bradley ed., 1945)). But cf. Henry
P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1370–71
(1973) (arguing that “Marbury itself provides the basis for a different model of judicial
competence” under which the Supreme Court “has the ‘special function’ in our frame of
government to declare authoritatively the meaning of the Constitution,” even in cases that
do not involve private rights).
3 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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rights model of standing, private litigants have standing to vindicate their
own private rights in an Article III court.  But a private litigant who seeks to
vindicate a public right stands on unsure footing.4  That, in rough outline, is
the law of private standing today.5
How does the private rights model apply to the standing of states to sue
in federal court?  The answer may seem obvious: distinguish, as the Court did
in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, between a state’s
“proprietary interests” on the one hand and its “sovereign” and “quasi-sover-
eign” interests on the other.6  For purposes of standing doctrine, proprietary
interests are like private rights.  The Snapp Court suggested, while sovereign
and quasi-sovereign interests are uniquely public rights.7  The easy cases are
those in which a state sues to vindicate proprietary interests.8  The hard cases
are those that involve a state’s sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests,9 particu-
4 “Public rights” include rights that protect the public in common, such as rights to
enforcement of the law, while “private rights” encompass individual claims under the com-
mon law, as well as some statutory and constitutional rights.  For recent discussions, see
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550–51 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); William
Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197.
5 Much of the debate about Article III standing in general, and the injury-in-fact
requirement in particular, concerns when, if ever, private citizens should have standing to
vindicate public rights. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Ste-
vens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 317 (2001) (discussing and
criticizing doctrine that “restrict[s] the ability of private citizens to vindicate broad public
rights”); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) (arguing that Congress should have authority to
create public standing); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1381–82 (1988) (arguing for standing doctrine that
permits “the adjudication of group rights at the behest of any member of the public”); Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689,
733 (2004) (arguing that history reflects a premise that “the unique advantage of the
courts lies in protecting private rights”).
6 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982).
7 Id. (explaining that “like other associations and private parties, a State is bound to
have a variety of proprietary interests. . . .  And like other such proprietors it may at times
need to pursue those interests in court”); see also id. at 601 (identifying interests that are
“based on [the state’s] sovereign character,” including “the power to create and enforce a
legal code” and “the maintenance and recognition of borders”); id. at 602 (defining quasi-
sovereign interests as “a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its
populace”).
8 See, e.g., Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 640 (2016) (arguing that “sovereignty and quasi-
sovereign interests” raise “[d]octrinal puzzles” but “proprietary injuries” do not).
9 Recent commentary on government standing has focused on injuries to a govern-
ment’s sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting
Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 85–90 (arguing for restrictive doctrine when states seek
to vindicate sovereign interests through federal litigation); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a
State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 854–55 (2016) (arguing that “States
are entitled to ‘special solitude’ . . . when they seek to enforce or defend state law,” a
quintessential sovereign interest); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA.
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larly because the Court suggested in Massachusetts v. EPA that such interests
may be due “special solicitude in [the] standing analysis.”10  In short, while a
state’s sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests may not fit within the private
rights model of standing, a state’s proprietary interests surely do.
This Essay’s aim is to think more carefully about the puzzle of a public
government’s “private” rights.  It is not apparent how the private rights
model of standing maps onto state standing, particularly in suits against the
federal government.  Historically, “public rights” encompassed a govern-
ment’s proprietary interests in property held on behalf of the public.11  And
today, state litigation against the federal government has put the distinctions
among proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests under strain.
States have brought politically controversial suits and requested nationwide
injunctions based upon injuries that may look like typically private, judicially
cognizable injuries, yet arguably raise the separation of powers concerns that
Article III standing doctrine is designed to avoid.
Thus, the distinction between “proprietary” interests on the one hand
and “sovereign” or “quasi-sovereign” interests on the other does not neatly
track the private rights model of standing.  Consider the following cases,
L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2013) (arguing that governments should be preferred litigants in dis-
putes about sovereign authority); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights
than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1701, 1704–05 (2008) (proposing that “courts relax the immediacy and redressability
prongs of the standing test when states bring parens patriae suits to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens”); Calvin
Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 252 (2009) (arguing
that Massachusetts v. EPA permits states to vindicate quasi-sovereign interests “that would
not be judicially cognizable if asserted by any individual citizen”); Jonathan Remy Nash,
Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 235 (2017) (arguing for “sover-
eign preemption state standing,” which would empower states to sue when “the Executive
Branch has underenforced . . . federal law in a way that is inconsistent with a governing
statute” and “the state [is] able to point to preemption of state law”); Stephen I. Vladeck,
States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 848–49 (2012) (arguing that states
generally should not have standing to espouse claims on behalf of their citizens against
federal government); Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 209, 210–11 (2014) (arguing for restrictive standing doctrine when govern-
ment seeks to litigate its sovereign interests).  Some commentary has developed
frameworks for understanding the varied interests that a state might seek to vindicate in
federal court. See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action]; Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action
Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2015) [hereinafter Davis, State Action Problem]; Amy J.
Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 273 (2007); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV.
387 (1995).
10 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
11 See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 566
(2007) (explaining that “public rights” in early American law included “proprietary rights
held by government on behalf of the people, such as the title to public lands or the owner-
ship of funds in the public treasury”).
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which raise hard questions about how to parse a state’s proprietary interests
in suits against the federal government:
• A state with a substantial egg farming industry sues a federal agency,
alleging that it has harmed the state’s economy by promulgating new
egg-related regulations.12  The state argues that it has suffered a
financial injury, the “paradigmatic”13 basis for Article III standing.
Such “Wallet Injury,”14 the state argues, is a prototypical proprietary
interest.  Has the state alleged a proprietary interest that suffices for
standing purposes?
• The President issues an executive order directing the construction of
a border wall.  A state with territory along the border sues.15  It
alleges that the wall will negatively impact land the state owns.  Does
the state’s standing depend upon whether a similarly situated land-
owner would have standing?16
• A state that operates a business sues a federal official, alleging that
the official has benefitted its competitors at the business’s expense.17
Under Article III, a private corporation may have standing to chal-
lenge federal agency action based upon a competitive injury.18  Does
a state have proprietary standing on the same grounds?
• A state sues to challenge a federal agency action that bars non-U.S.
nationals from entering the United States to attend university.19  The
state claims standing as a proprietor of the public university where
those individuals are enrolled.  Under Article III and third-party
standing doctrine, schools may have standing to assert the rights of
their students when those rights are bound up with the school’s inter-
ests.20  Does the state have to satisfy the same test, or is it due special
solicitude even when it sues to vindicate a proprietary interest?
• A federal agency threatens to strip all federal funding from a state
because the state has adopted a policy that purportedly undermines
12 Cf. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2017) (considering
standing of six States to sue a seventh State to challenge its egg-related regulations).
13 Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005).
14 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Wallet Injury is . . . [a] concrete and particularized
injury . . . .”).
15 See In re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
16 Cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 561,
626 (1852) (holding that State could bring public nuisance action against bridge
obstructing public navigation “on the same ground and to the same extent as a corpora-
tion or individual may” because it had suffered “special damage” to its property).
17 See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 725 (D. Md. 2018).
18 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970).
19 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
20 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.13 (1976).
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federal immigration enforcement.21  The state sues before the
agency has carried out the threat.  The United States argues that
while preenforcement review may be available to protect private
rights, the state has no proprietary interest at stake and therefore
lacks standing to seek preenforcement review.22  Is that right?
This Essay charts the analytical and doctrinal confusion arising from the
category of “proprietary” interests in state standing law.  This category might
be taken literally to include only the ownership of property and interests that
stem from it.23  It might refer to interests that are analogous to those that a
private corporation might litigate,24 or instead to any type of financial injury
a state might suffer.25  Other possibilities would limit “proprietary” interests
to those interests recognized under the common law,26 or only those inter-
ests recognized under private law.27  Perhaps the most that can be said is that
“proprietary” interests should be understood to refer to any interests that are
analogous to those of private parties.28  In addition to this definitional puz-
zle, there is confusion among courts about how to treat “proprietary” inter-
ests in the standing analysis.  In many recent cases, states have tried to clear
the standing hurdle by combining “proprietary” interests with “sovereign”
21 See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 517 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-16886,
No. 17-16887, 2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018).
22 Id. at 518 (considering such an argument).
23 See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Essay, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking
New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1031–32 (2008)
(“In the first category [of state standing doctrine] are proprietary interests such as owner-
ship of land or participation in a business venture.”).
24 My earlier work on a state’s typically private interests referred to a state’s “corpo-
rate” interests, offering common-law rights of action in contract and property as examples.
Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 17–18.  That work also referred more
broadly to the typically private interests of states. See id. at 5.  This Essay is an attempt to
think through the relevant distinctions in a more nuanced way than prior scholarship,
including my own, has done.
25 In recent work I have explored the emergence of financial injuries, which courts
often treat as necessarily “proprietary,” as a basis for state suits against the federal govern-
ment.  I argue that financial injuries to states are often distinguishable from the injuries
that private parties typically suffer. See Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV.
1229, 1235–36 (2019).
26 See David A. Nagdeman, Comment, Sovereign Ephemera: State Standing Against the Fed-
eral Government for Injuries to Quasi-Sovereign Interests, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 63 (2017) (defin-
ing “proprietary interests” as “[c]ommon law interests”).
27 See infra subsection II.A.5.
28 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age
of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 109 (2018) (“States have many of the same interests that
private parties do, and in many cases state litigation will have private analogs (or may be
brought contemporaneously with private parties).”); Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 213
(referring to proprietary category of state interests as “[i]nterests similar to those of private
parties” (emphasis omitted)).
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and “quasi-sovereign” interests.29  In some cases, moreover, states have
argued that they are due “special solicitude” under Massachusetts v. EPA even
when they sue to vindicate a proprietary interest.30
Together, these analytical and doctrinal questions make up a complex
puzzle involving Article III, separation of powers, federalism, and the
enforcement of rights.  But this puzzle need not and should not be solved in
every case.
To bring greater analytical clarity, this Essay proposes a sequence of
decisionmaking in state standing cases.  Its thesis is that the starting point of
analysis of state standing in any particular case should be whether the state
has standing under the typical Article III and prudential rules.  If a state
would have standing under the typical rules applicable to private parties,
then the only question is whether there is some reason to show special disfa-
vor to the state.  Courts should address questions about special solicitude
only in those cases where a state would lack standing under the rules applica-
ble to private parties.  This standing analysis should look to the merits of the
dispute and the relief the state seeks, and ask whether the state is seeking to
enforce its own rights or the rights of a third party and whether the rights it is
seeking to enforce are private rights or public rights.31
The Essay proceeds in three Parts.  Part I parses the interests of states
under the modern doctrine.  Part II explores the puzzle that these doctrinal
distinctions create.  Part III lays out an order of battle to help clarify the
grounds of debate about state standing in any particular case,32 and consid-
ers the costs and benefits of this order of decisionmaking.
29 See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 398–99 (2011) (arguing that “categorically distinct
interests” of states may be aggregated for standing purposes).
30 Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)); see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up:
State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2017) (“Even
the basic question of what warrants special solicitude remains unclear: ‘proprietary’ inter-
ests, ‘sovereign’ interests, and ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests have traditionally been distinct
bases for standing.”).
31 By focusing upon the underlying substantive law that the state seeks to enforce, Part
III argues, we can cut through much of the confusion that arises from the Snapp Court’s
distinctions among “proprietary,” “sovereign,” and “quasi-sovereign” interests.  Thus, this
Essay builds upon the work of scholars who have argued that standing determinations are
inevitably bound up with the merits. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Stand-
ing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2015) (“[W]hether a plaintiff has suffered a judicially
cognizable injury . . . frequently turns on the provision of law under which a plaintiff seeks
relief.”); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (argu-
ing that standing analysis should ask, “[d]oes the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial
enforcement of an asserted legal duty?”); cf. Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note
9, at 1 (looking to substantive law to determine when a government has an implied right to
sue).
32 The most familiar “order of battle” problem in constitutional law concerns the
sequence of decisionmaking for constitutional tort litigation involving qualified immunity.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding, contrary to Saucier v. Katz, 533
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I. PARSING THE INTERESTS OF STATES
What exactly do we mean when we say that a state has some interests that
mirror those of private parties for standing purposes?  And how might the
answer matter?  This Part raises these questions.
A. Private Standing and Private Rights
Over the past four decades, the Court has developed a set of constitu-
tional and prudential limits on private standing that are by now familiar.  To
have Article III standing to sue, a private plaintiff must point to an injury in
fact that (i) is concrete and particularized, (ii) was caused by the defendant,
and (iii) may be redressed through judicial relief.33  The purpose of these
constitutional standing requirements, the Court has explained, is to protect
the separation of powers by limiting judicial authority to resolving cases and
controversies.34  In addition, the Court has developed prudential limits on
private standing in an Article III court.  Litigants may not, for example, sue to
vindicate the rights of third parties unless one of the exceptions to the ban
on third-party standing applies.35
Under this private rights model, private parties typically have constitu-
tional and prudential standing to litigate their own private rights.  Private
rights include rights to bodily integrity, contract, liberty, and property.  Com-
mon-law causes of action have long been available to protect such rights,
though the metes and bounds of these causes have changed over time.
American law also recognizes private rights under the Constitution and statu-
tory law.  And although Blackstone defined “private rights” as those “belong-
ing to individuals, considered as individuals,”36 we now define them to
include rights belonging to private entities, such as private corporations, as
well.
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion in the Court’s recent
standing decision in Spokeo v. Robins summarized the private rights model of
standing.37  In Spokeo, the Court held that an injury in fact must be not only
particularized, but also concrete: concreteness and particularity, in other
words, are independent requirements for an injury in fact.38  In his concur-
ring opinion, Thomas grounded contemporary standing doctrine in the
U.S. 194 (2001), that courts need not resolve substantive constitutional issue of whether
defendant violated a constitutional right, but may instead decide that qualified immunity is
available because a right was not clearly established at the time of defendant’s miscon-
duct); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 115; Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV.
1539 (2007).
33 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013). See generally
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
34 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
35 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1976).
36 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
37 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 1545 (majority opinion).
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common-law distinction between private rights and public rights.39  In pri-
vate rights cases, such as, for example, those involving trespass to real prop-
erty, courts traditionally have presumed that the violation of a personal, legal
right is a “de facto injury.”40  By contrast, when a private plaintiff sues to vindi-
cate public rights, that is, “duties owed ‘to the whole community, considered
as a community, in its social aggregate capacity,’” common-law courts typi-
cally required the plaintiff to allege facts showing that they had suffered a
personal harm that distinguished them from the general public.41
This distinction, Thomas argued, has been carried forward into the
Court’s Article III jurisprudence.42  Where “private individuals sue to redress
violations of their own private rights,” the “separation-of-powers concerns
underlying our public-rights decisions are not implicated.”43  A plaintiff
suing to enforce a private right, in other words, need not “assert an actual
injury beyond the violation” of the right itself.44  By contrast, when a private
plaintiff sues to enforce a public right, the Court has been concerned to “pre-
vent[ ] the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are primarily political in
nature.”45  It has, therefore, required a private plaintiff to allege a “‘con-
crete’ injury particular to himself” in suits involving public rights, one that
involves “individualized harm” rather nothing more than harm to the gen-
eral public.46  While we may debate the details, as well as whether Article III
mandates a private rights model,47 Thomas’s concurring opinion nicely cap-
tures the centrality of that model to modern standing doctrine.
B. The Types of State Interests
How does this private rights model apply to state standing?  In some
cases, states may have to satisfy the same constitutional and prudential
39 Id. at 1551–52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 1551; see also Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
41 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *41).
42 Id. at 1552.
43 Id.
44 Id.  As Professor Andrew Hessick has shown, however, the federal courts have not
always granted standing in cases involving private rights. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing,
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 277 (2008) (“[A]lthough the
Court has claimed that its standing requirements are necessary to preserve the traditional
limits on the judiciary, those requirements have precluded claims that courts historically
would have permitted.”).
45 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 1552, 1554.
47 See James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy
Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 212–13 (2018) (developing an approach to standing
that begins with “Justice Thomas’s familiar distinction between public and private rights,”
but parting company insofar as the Justice took “a too-narrow view of the historical ability
of litigants to mount public or popular actions”); see also Baude, supra note 4, at 198
(“While Justice Thomas’s proposal is not yet fully developed, it may provide a theoretically
satisfying way to make sense of the Court’s approach to statutory standing.”).
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requirements as private litigants.  In other cases, they may sue even when a
private litigant would lack standing.  Whether a state must meet the typical
Article III and prudential requirements may turn upon the interest that the
state seeks to vindicate.  According to the Court, states may sue based upon
any of several different interests: proprietary interests, sovereign interests,
and quasi-sovereign interests.48
1. Proprietary Interests
Proprietary interests are not unique to states.  When a state’s standing
rests upon proprietary interests, Snapp suggested, states may sue on the same
terms as a private litigant: “[L]ike other associations and private parties, a
State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. . . .  And like other
such proprietors it may at times need to pursue those interests in court.”49
2. Sovereign Interests
A state may also sue to vindicate its uniquely sovereign interests.  It may,
for example, have standing to vindicate its authority to make and enforce
laws.50  An uncontroversial example involves state standing to defend state
laws on appeal.51  A state may also sue to “demand . . . recognition from
other sovereigns.”52  Border disputes between states are one example.53  So
too are cases involving claims of intergovernmental immunity.54  The Court
has—without commenting on standing—permitted states to sue the federal
government to enforce the Tenth Amendment ban on commandeering.55
3. Quasi-Sovereign Interests
The Snapp Court’s standing analysis focused upon a third type of state
interest: quasi-sovereign interests.  A state has quasi-sovereign interests in the
“well-being of its populace.”56  Such interests support parens patriae suits
designed to protect state residents.57 Snapp itself involved the Common-
48 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).  For
a comprehensive analysis of Snapp, see Seth Davis, State Standing for Equality, 79 LA. L. REV.
147, 155–67 (2018).
49 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02.
50 Id. at 601.
51 See, e.g., Grove, supra note 9, at 858 (“One of [the] background principles [of gov-
ernment standing doctrine] is the concept that a sovereign government must have stand-
ing to enforce and defend its laws in court.”).
52 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
53 See id.
54 See Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 18.
55 E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
56 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
57 Id.  Under English law, the Crown traditionally had a parens patriae authority to act
“as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves.”  Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). Parens patriae standing in American federal
courts law is roughly analogous to this traditional concept insofar as it involves a state
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 10  1-JUL-19 13:35
2100 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
wealth of Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its “residents
from the harmful effects of discrimination,” as Puerto Rico had standing to
sue Virginia apple growers for discriminating against Puerto Rican migrant
workers in violation of federal immigration and labor laws.58
C. The Doctrinal Significance of the Different Types of State Interests
Snapp suggests that a state seeking to vindicate its proprietary interests
must establish standing on the same terms as a private litigant.  “[L]ike other
. . . proprietors,” the Court explained, a state “may at times need to pursue
[its] interests in court.”59  Scholars have similarly concluded that a state must
meet the typical Article III and prudential requirements when it premises
standing upon proprietary interests.60  “The doctrinal puzzles grow instead
out of decisions regarding the other two categories: sovereign[ ] and quasi-
sovereign interests.”61  Courts and commentators have had much to say
about those puzzles, particularly in recent years.62
Particularly puzzling has been the Court’s suggestion in Massachusetts v.
EPA that states enjoy “special solicitude in [the] standing analysis.”63  In that
case, Massachusetts sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
denying a petition for rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles.64  The EPA argued that its denial of the petition did not
inflict a concrete injury that would distinguish the State from any member of
representing the interests of its residents when they cannot themselves bring suit.  But
“[t]he nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the United States
beyond that which existed in England.” Id.
58 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 598 n.5, 609.  The Court treated Puerto Rico as indistinguishable
from a state for standing purposes.  In holding that the Commonwealth had standing, the
Court also pointed to Puerto Rico’s direct participation in the “federal employment
scheme” at issue on the merits. See id. at 610 (reasoning that “the fact that the Common-
wealth participates directly in the operation of the federal employment scheme” afforded
it a “compelling . . . parens patriae interest in assuring that the scheme operates to the full
benefit of its residents”).
59 Id. at 601–02.
60 See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 28, at 109 (analogizing state’s proprietary inter-
ests to those of private parties for standing purposes); Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 213
(explaining that when government sues based upon proprietary interests, it “generally
needs an injury in fact”); cf. Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 6 (reaching
similar conclusion with respect to implication of right of action to sue).
61 Roesler, supra note 8, at 640.
62 Some scholars argue that the federal courts should be wary of permitting the states
to litigate public actions against the federal government. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 9, at
848–49; Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 236.  Others have argued that states have unique
sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests that support standing, even in cases where a private
party may lack standing. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 9, at 1440 (sovereign interests); Mank,
supra note 9, at 1704–05 (quasi-sovereign interests).
63 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
64 Id. at 505.  The EPA concluded that the Clean Air Act did not authorize it to pro-
mulgate regulations in order to address problems of climate change, a determination that
the Court rejected on the merits. See id. at 511, 532.
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the public.65  Massachusetts argued that, to the contrary, it had several judi-
cially cognizable interests, including its proprietary interest in its receding
coast line, its sovereign interest in regulating emissions contributing to cli-
mate change, which federal law had preempted, and its quasi-sovereign inter-
est in protecting its residents’ well-being.66  Reasoning that the State was
“entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing analysis,” the Court con-
cluded Massachusetts had standing to sue.67
Massachusetts v. EPA portended a shift in public law litigation toward
state standing.  Today, states are leading public law litigants in politically con-
troversial suits against the federal government.  In recent litigation, for exam-
ple, state attorneys general have brought controversial public law questions
before federal district courts and requested preliminary nationwide relief,
which the (sometimes carefully selected) district court judges have been will-
ing to award.68
Perhaps unsurprisingly, states are claiming “proprietary interests” to
ground many of these suits. Snapp suggests that proprietary interests suffice
for standing as a matter of course.69  And Massachusetts v. EPA can be read to
afford special solicitude to a state’s proprietary interests.70 Massachusetts v.
Mellon, moreover, held that a state lacked standing to challenge a federal
statute as infringing on its sovereign interests under the Tenth Amend-
ment.71  The Court also held that a state may not sue the federal government
as a parens patriae representative to vindicate its citizens’ constitutional
rights.72  While it is unclear how much of Mellon has survived the Court’s
modern restatement of state standing doctrine,73 a state that can rest its
standing upon proprietary interests need not worry about the Mellon bar.
Some scholars, moreover, have questioned whether states should have
sovereign or parens patriae standing to sue the federal government.  As Profes-
sor Ann Woolhandler has argued, such suits may call for “abstract judicial
determinations of the validity of governmental action,” undermine “the fed-
65 See id. at 517 (summarizing EPA’s argument).
66 See id. at 519–21.
67 Id. at 520.
68 See, e.g., Emma Platoff, By Gutting Obamacare, Judge Reed O’Connor Handed Texas a
Win. It Wasn’t the First Time, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/
2018/12/19/reed-oconnor-federal-judge-texas-obamacare-forum-shopping-ken-paxton/
(“The Texas Attorney General’s Office has made a habit of filing lawsuits against the fed-
eral government that land in O’Connor’s court.”).
69 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982) (“[L]ike other . . . proprietors [the state] may at times need to pursue those inter-
ests in court.”).
70 See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
71 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484–85 (1923).
72 See id. at 485–86.
73 States may, for example, sue the federal government in anticommandeering and
anticoercion cases to vindicate sovereign interests under the Tenth Amendment. E.g., New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (state successfully sued federal government on
anticommandeering grounds).
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eralism principle that state and federal governments should act primarily on
the people rather than on each other,” and raise individual rights concerns
by crowding out private enforcement of public law.74  For these reasons,
Woolhandler argues that federal courts should decline to hear “governmen-
tal sovereignty actions.”75
It is not clear, however, that limiting states to the litigation of proprietary
interests would avoid the separation of powers, federalism, and individual
rights concerns that governmental sovereignty actions may raise.  It depends
in part, of course, on how one defines a state’s “proprietary” interests.  And as
states increasingly base public law litigation on proprietary interests, that ana-
lytical challenge becomes more pressing and more difficult.
II. THE PUZZLE OF A PUBLIC GOVERNMENT’S “PROPRIETARY” INTERESTS
In short, it is time to treat the category of a government’s “proprietary”
interests as a puzzle in its own right.  The possibility of sweeping state stand-
ing to sue the federal government based upon “proprietary” interests raises
separation of powers concerns that the federal courts will become embroiled
in resolving political disputes that are not amenable to judicial resolution,
and, in the course of doing so, will undermine their legitimacy.76  This Part
discusses three of the most important analytical and doctrinal pieces of the
puzzle: how should a government’s “proprietary” interests be defined, should
they be afforded special solicitude, and should they be analyzed indepen-
dently or instead added to sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests to support
standing.  Thus, this Part makes the first of this Essay’s contributions to our
understanding of state standing, showing that we need to think more care-
fully about the puzzle of “proprietary” interests.
A. Five Ways of Defining “Proprietary” Interests
Snapp’s discussion of typically “private,” “proprietary” interests can be
read more than one way:
[L]ike other associations and private parties, a State is bound to have a vari-
ety of proprietary interests.  A State may, for example, own land or partici-
pate in a business venture.  As a proprietor, it is likely to have the same
interests as other similarly situated proprietors.  And like other such proprie-
tors it may at times need to pursue those interests in court.77
74 See Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 209–10.
75 See id. at 209, 236.
76 See Tara Leigh Grove, Essay, Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
2243, 2245 (2017) (arguing that the “rise in ‘government versus government’ lawsuits . . .
may not bode well for the long-term independence of ‘the Third Branch’”).
77 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982).
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The Court apparently meant to define a class of cases in which a state’s stand-
ing is like that of private parties.78  But it remains unclear what comparison
courts should draw between state and private litigation when defining that
class of cases.  The cases and commentary reveal not a single, clearly defined
category, but rather a cluster of ideas about the types of interests that are
typically private.  Courts and commentators have defined these interests as
involving “ownership of land or participation in a business venture,”79 “cor-
porate” interests,80 financial interests,81 “common law” interests,82 or “pri-
vate law” interests.83
1. Ownership and Contractual Interests
Perhaps Snapp’s dicta concerning proprietary interests should be taken
to refer to only those interests that stem from a state’s ownership of property
and its contractual agreements.84  That may seem like a sensible comparison
as far as it goes.  States have some ownership interests that may not be mean-
ingfully distinguishable from a private party’s ownership interests.
The hard question is how far a state’s ownership interests go.  Pitched at
the right level of generality, for example, a state’s “ownership” interests
include its interests over all the territory within its jurisdiction.85  If, for
example, a state sues the federal government to challenge the construction
of a wall along its border, which the state alleges will be a nuisance, should it
be treated as a private proprietor for standing purposes?  Or does such a suit
involve a state’s uniquely sovereign interests in its borders or its quasi-sover-
eign interests in the health and well-being of its residents?86  Without some
78 See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 213 (noting that government “generally
needs an injury in fact” when it “sues to vindicate interests that would give an individual a
lawsuit in similar circumstances” (footnote omitted)); see also Davis, Implied Public Rights of
Action, supra note 9, at 17 (offering similar account of black letter law).
79 Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 23, at 1031.
80 See Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 17–18.
81 See Davis, supra note 25, at 1234.
82 See, e.g., Nagdeman, supra note 26, at 63 (referring to proprietary interests as
“[c]ommon law interests”); Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 213 (explaining that
“[c]ommentators have referred to [the] category [of typically private interests] as proprie-
tary, common law, or corporate interests”).
83 See Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State
Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 370 (2018) (arguing that states in recent public law litigation
have “position[ed] themselves as being no different from private litigants and alleg[ed]
private law harms when doing so”).
84 See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 23, at 1031–32.
85 Seth Davis, The Private Law State, 63 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
24) (“We might think of states as owners of territory . . . .”).
86 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982) (identifying “maintenance and recognition of borders” as sovereign interest of a
state and interests in “well-being of its populace” as a quasi-sovereign interest); Robert A.
Schapiro, Judicial Federalism and the Challenges of State Constitutional Contestation, 115 PENN
ST. L. REV. 983, 995 (2011) (noting that harm to a state’s coastline “implicate[s] a proprie-
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reference to the specific legal claims that the state seeks to bring, it is not easy
to determine how to categorize the state’s interests.87
2. Corporate Interests
The same sort of question arises if the comparison is between a state and
a private corporation.  Private corporations have various interests that sup-
port standing to sue in the federal court.  These interests are not limited to
property rights or even the common-law causes of action.  For example, a
corporation may have Article III standing to sue the federal government
when it suffers a competitive injury,88 even though there is no common-law
right to be free from competition.89  May a state,90 even though a state is not
a for-profit corporation?  To the extent, moreover, that a state seeks to sue to
vindicate the sort of intangible public interests that nonprofits and private
associations might seek to vindicate, it is not clear whether to classify the
interest as a “corporate” interest.
Consider, for example, state litigation challenging the Trump adminis-
tration’s ban on travel from majority-Muslim countries.  The States of Wash-
ington and Minnesota sued to enjoin the first iteration of this Muslim travel
ban, alleging that it violated the First Amendment and equal protection
rights of individuals.91  The Ninth Circuit held that the States could sue as
owners of their public universities and could invoke third-party standing on
the same terms as a private university to assert the rights of students and
scholars who were denied entry under the ban.92  Thus, the States could be
understood to have litigated based upon their typically private “corporate”
interests, which, the Ninth Circuit implicitly held, were broader than those
interests arising from property rights.  But to the extent that the States
sought to espouse the individual constitutional rights of their residents, the
case arguably presented the sort of quasi-sovereign, parens patriae standing
that Mellon denies to states when they sue the federal government.
tary interest of the state as landowner, or conceivably a sovereign interest of the state in its
territorial integrity”).
87 A similar problem arises with respect to a state’s contractual interests.  The Court
has characterized “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power [as] much in the
nature of a contract:  in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions.”  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Is a state’s interest under such a “contract” a proprietary interest? See Lemos & Young,
supra note 28, at 110 (classifying state’s interest under contract with federal government as
proprietary).  Or is it a uniquely sovereign interest arising from the intergovernmental
relationship between the states and the federal government?
88 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158 (1970).
89 See Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 483 (1938) (“The only injury of which [a
plaintiff] can be heard in a judicial tribunal to complain is the invasion of some legal or
equitable right.  If he asserts that the competition . . . damages him, the answer is, that it
does not abridge or impair any such right.”).
90 See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 745–46 (D. Md. 2018).
91 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
92 Id. at 1159–61, 1161 n.5.
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3. Financial Interests
Perhaps, however, what distinguished the typically private interests at
stake in the travel ban litigation from the intangible quasi-sovereign interests
in Mellon was the fact of a personal financial harm, which the States alleged
resulted from the Muslim travel ban.93  To allege a “concrete” injury, the
Court explained in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a plaintiff must allege a “de facto”
injury that “actually exist[s],” one that is “ ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”94  Actual
injuries may be tangible, such as economic injuries, or intangible, such as
aesthetic injuries, but intangible injuries may be less likely to satisfy Article III
requirements.95
We might think that some tangible injuries are characteristically private
even when a state claims them as the basis for standing.  In an important
recent article, Professor Raymond Brescia has focused upon the “private
character of [the] harm[ ]” that states are alleging to support suits against
the federal government, arguing that these harms “are taking on a fairly pri-
vate character.”96  These characteristically private injuries, Brescia argues,
“include injuries to economic interests” of the states.97
States indeed are bringing public law litigation against the federal gov-
ernment based upon economic interests.  As I have argued elsewhere,
“[s]tate standing to sue the federal government for financial injuries is the
new public standing.”98  In these cases, states characterize their financial
injuries as “proprietary,” and for good strategic reason.  A “Wallet Injury”99 is
the “paradigmatic” injury in fact.100  This type of injury may seem like a nec-
essarily private injury to the pocketbooks of states as proprietors.
Financial injuries to states underscore, however, the analytical mistake in
attempting to define some types of tangible injuries as necessarily private.
Whether states must meet the same Article III requirements as private liti-
gants, or whether they may sue the federal government, should not be deter-
mined in this way.  States may suffer financial injuries that are similar to those
that private parties suffer.  But they may also suffer financial injuries in their
sovereign capacities.
93 See id. at 1160 (“The University of Washington has already incurred the costs of visa
applications [for two] interns and will lose its investment if they are not admitted.”).
94 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95 Id. at 1549.  For intangible injuries, Spokeo concludes, a court should look to
whether the alleged harm has a “close relationship” to harms recognized by the common
law and to whether Congress has identified the harm as one for judicial cognizance. Id.
96 Brescia, supra note 83, at 366.
97 Id. at 367.
98 Davis, supra note 25, at 1229.
99 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Wallet Injury is . . . [a] concrete and particularized
injury . . . .”).
100 See Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005) (explain-
ing that an economic injury is the “paradigmatic” injury in fact).
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In particular, there are multiple ways in which states have claimed finan-
cial injuries in recent suits against the federal government.101  The first is
similar to the sorts of wallet injuries that private litigants claim as a matter of
course.  A state may run a business that suffers a financial loss that would
support standing to sue in federal court.  In the recent emoluments litiga-
tion, for example, Maryland and the District of Columbia sued President
Trump, alleging that his acceptance of unconstitutional emoluments has
harmed the ability of their hotels to compete with Trump properties.102  But
the financial injury alleged by California in the ongoing sanctuary jurisdic-
tion litigation,103 as well as the financial injuries alleged by Texas in Texas v.
United States104 and Brackeen v. Zinke,105 arise from the States’ activities as
sovereign governments. Texas v. United States involved a financial injury in
the form of the costs of providing driver’s licenses to undocumented immi-
grants, an injury inextricably bound up in the State’s regulation of driving
and its provision of government services.106  And Brackeen involved the costs
to the state court and child welfare systems of complying with preemptive
federal law.107
Injuries to a state’s regulatory budget or its general economy may be
counted in dollars and cents.  It does not follow, however, that these injuries
are “proprietary” and therefore suffice for Article III standing as a matter of
course.  Perhaps a state should have standing to sue anyone, including the
federal government, whenever it can allege a financial injury.  If so, it is not
because this type of injury is necessarily indistinguishable from the sort of
“tangible” economic injury that a private corporation might suffer.
101 For an extended discussion of state standing and financial injuries, which lays out
the argument in detail, see Davis, supra note 25, at 1242–49.
102 See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 748, 752–53 (D. Md. 2018).
103 See California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1019 (N.D. Cal.
2018).  I have participated as an amicus in support of the State of California and counties
in various sanctuary jurisdiction cases.
104 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per
curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
105 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018), appeal filed sub nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt,
No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2018).  I participated as an amicus in support of the
Defendants-Appellants at the court of appeals in this case.
106 See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (concluding that state could challenge the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program, a
federal immigration enforcement policy, because DAPA would “directly injure the proprie-
tary interests” of state).
107 See First Amended Complaint & Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 6–8,
13, 60, Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-868) [herein-
after First Amended Complaint] (alleging standing to raise constitutional challenges to
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012), based upon States’ costs of com-
plying with the Act).
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4. Common-Law Interests
Rather than focusing upon the tangibility of injury, a comparison of
state standing with private standing might look to the type of law that the
state invokes on the merits.  The Court has stated that “Article III’s restriction
of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to
mean ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and
resolved by, the judicial process.’”108  As one court of appeals put it,
“[i]njuries to rights recognized at common law—property, contracts, and
torts—have always been sufficient for standing purposes.”109  A state’s “pro-
prietary interests” might be a shorthand reference to these common-law
actions.  On this view, a state has standing on the same terms as a private
party whenever it brings a common-law action.
States have, however, long enjoyed common-law causes of action that
private parties did not.  Under the common law, private litigants did not gen-
erally have the right to sue to abate a public nuisance.110  But attorneys gen-
eral could bring equitable actions to abate public nuisances.111  Indeed,
“[t]he common-law duties of the attorney general, as chief law officer of the
state, when not restricted or limited by statute, [were and] are very numerous
and varied.”112  To conflate a state’s “proprietary” interests with its “common
law” interests is to obscure the common law’s distinctions between states and
private proprietors.
5. Private Law Interests
One way to avoid this confusion might be to define a state’s “proprie-
tary” interests as only those involving “private law harms.”113 Contract, prop-
erty, and tort law—not to mention fiduciary law and the law of
restitution114—provide causes of action to address harms that one private
party inflicts on another.  Perhaps the Snapp Court meant to suggest that a
state has standing on the same terms as a private litigant only when it invokes
private law.
108 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
109 Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d
794, 800 (5th Cir. 2012).
110 Instead, a private litigant had to allege “special damage” that distinguished her from
the general public in order to sue for public nuisance. See City of Georgetown v. Alexan-
dria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98 (1838) (emphasis omitted); Davis, State Action
Problem, supra note 9, at 608–09 (discussing public nuisance law).
111 See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ark. 1945).
112 Id.
113 Cf. Brescia, supra note 83, at 370 (arguing that states in recent public law litigation
have “position[ed] themselves as being no different from private litigants and alleg[ed]
private law harms when doing so”).
114 See, e.g., Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1145, 1146 (2014); Mark P. Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927,
1929 (2001).
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The underlying law is important in defining the cases in which a state’s
standing is indistinguishable from that of a private party.  But limiting that
set of cases to those involving private law is underinclusive.  States may have
interests indistinguishable from private parties under public law,115 not just
under private law.  Where that is the case, it is not clear why we would distin-
guish states from private parties in the standing analysis.
In defining which state interests are typically private for purposes of
standing doctrine, the most promising approach would consider the type of
interest the state claims in light of the law the state seeks to invoke on the
merits.  To label all such interests “proprietary,” however, creates more con-
fusion than it resolves.
B. Special Solicitude (or Special Disfavor?) for “Proprietary” Interests
Of course, the distinction between “proprietary” interests on the one
hand and “sovereign” and “quasi-sovereign” interests on the other matters
less to the extent that states must satisfy the same standing requirements for
each.  But in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court stated that states are “not nor-
mal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”116  What the
Court meant has also been a source of doctrinal confusion.  Indeed, “[e]ven
the basic question of what warrants special solicitude remains unclear: ‘pro-
prietary’ interests, ‘sovereign’ interests, and ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests have
traditionally been distinct bases for standing.”117
While many commentators have assumed that a state must satisfy the
same standing requirements as private parties when suing to vindicate a pro-
prietary interest, courts have sometimes assumed precisely the opposite.  As
one federal district court recently summarized the black letter law, states “are
entitled to ‘special solicitude’ when they seek to vindicate their ‘proprietary’”
interests, which the court defined as “those that a state may have akin to a
private party.”118  And, as some commentators have discussed, Massachusetts
v. EPA might be read to support special solicitude, particularly in the Article
III causation and redressability analyses, even where a state’s standing turns
upon proprietary interests.119  In that case, the Court afforded special solici-
tude to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts while emphasizing that it “does
in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected.’”120  But the
Court’s discussion of the Commonwealth’s standing based upon its interests
as a landowner can be read as “independent of the ‘special solicitude’
115 See Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 36.
116 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
117 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 30, at 1745.
118 Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 158 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
119 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 29, at 398 (considering possibility that Court in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA “was finding ordinary proprietary standing, albeit partly because states’
quasi-sovereign interests justify ‘special solicitude’ in the proprietary interest analysis”); cf.
Lemos & Young, supra note 28, at 109 n.302 (arguing that special solicitude in Massachu-
setts v. EPA went more to causation than to injury-in-fact requirement of Article III).
120 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519.
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afforded to states.”121  If the typical standing requirements apply to a state’s
proprietary interests, but not to its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests,
then the distinctions among those interests are a matter of no small doctrinal
significance.
The commentary on state standing has focused upon special solicitude
for a state’s sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, but it is conceivable that
states might be due special disfavor in the standing analysis.  Elsewhere I have
explored arguments for and against special disfavor for states when they sue
the federal government based upon financial injuries.122  For example, fed-
eral courts have concluded that “[e]conomic harm to a business clearly con-
stitutes an injury-in-fact,”123 and have permitted businesses to sue federal
agencies based upon so-called competitive injuries.124  It is arguable, how-
ever, that the  reasons for opening the courthouse doors to private competi-
tors challenging agency action do not apply with the same force to states that
are operating businesses.  States, moreover, may have greater capacity to
influence federal agency action through the political process.125  Perhaps,
therefore, when it comes to states, the federal courts should follow the tradi-
tional common-law rule that competitive injury “does not lay the foundation
for an action.”126  At least, courts might more closely assess whether the
underlying law protects the state’s competitive interest and whether judicial
relief would redress the alleged competitive injury.127  Even if, as I have
argued,128 the case for special disfavor is not decisive, it does suggest that
federal courts should be wary of granting special solicitude in cases in which
a state claims the same sort of interest that a private party might claim as a
basis for standing.129
121 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 70; see Vladeck, supra note 9, at 856–57 (arguing that Massachusetts
v. EPA “turned to ordinary Article III analysis—relying on the conclusion that rising sea
levels would directly injure Massachusetts’s proprietary interests as a coastal property
owner”).
122 Davis, The New Public Standing, supra note 25, at 1269–82.
123 Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
124 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158
(1970).
125 Davis, The New Public Standing, supra note 25, at 1280.
126 Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
127 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47
UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1346–47 (2000) (explaining that courts tend to presume that private
competitors’ interests are protected by underlying law and that judicial relief would redress
the alleged competitive injury).
128 See Davis, The New Public Standing, supra note 25, at 1283.
129 In other work I have argued that there is no good reason for special solicitude when
a state sues to vindicate a typically private interest. See Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action,
supra note 9, at 34–35.  As a matter of remedial justice, states have no special claim on
federal judicial action.  If anything, their claims of a personal right to a remedy are weaker
than those of individual victims of legal wrongs. See id. at 14–15 (arguing, as a matter of
both corrective justice and civil recourse theory, that neither the United States nor states
are due special solicitude in the provision of remedies in federal courts).  And, as I have
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C. Adding “Proprietary” to “Sovereign” and “Quasi-Sovereign” Interests
In most cases, however, states do not rest their standing arguments solely
upon typically private interests.  That is particularly true in state suits against
the federal government.  Instead, they point not only to “proprietary,” but
also to “sovereign” and “quasi-sovereign” interests to support standing to sue.
Yet another puzzle arises when states seek to combine proprietary, sovereign,
and quasi-sovereign interests to clear the standing hurdle.
A recent example of this piece of the puzzle is Texas v. United States.130
In that case, Texas sued to enjoin implementation of the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (“DAPA”) program.131  DAPA directed the Department
of Homeland Security to defer immigration enforcement for undocumented
parents of American citizens and lawful permanent residents.  Among other
things, DAPA-eligible individuals would be entitled to state driver’s licenses
under Texas law.  Issuing a driver’s license to DAPA beneficiaries would have
cost Texas $130.89 per person, or millions of dollars for the approximately
500,000 beneficiaries then residing in the State.132  The district court held
that DAPA thus would “directly injure the proprietary interests” of Texas.133
The court of appeals affirmed but did not premise its standing determination
squarely upon these so-called proprietary interests.  Instead, citing the
“direct, substantial pressure directed” at Texas to alter its drivers’ license
regime in light of its financial injuries,134 the court of appeals afforded “spe-
cial solicitude” to the State’s sovereign interest in enacting and enforcing its
own laws.135
Just as it was not clear in Massachusetts v. EPA whether special solicitude
applied to the State’s proprietary injury or to its sovereign (or quasi-sover-
eign) injuries, so too in Texas v. United States it was not clear which interest
warranted special solicitude.  Both cases suggest that states may sometimes
combine proprietary interests with sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests in
order to establish standing.  When states do so, it is far from clear how the
traditional Article III standing analysis should apply.
One possibility is that the analysis should proceed by addition.  Where,
for example, states cannot clear the standing hurdle based upon sovereign or
argued, Massachusetts v. EPA should not be read to the contrary, because the special solici-
tude it afforded states turned upon uniquely public interests in regulating to combat cli-
mate change. See id. at 52.
130 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016).
131 See id. at 146.
132 Id. at 155.
133 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
134 Texas, 809 F.3d at 154.
135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the “causal link” between Texas’s
proprietary injury and DAPA was “even closer” than the link between Massachusetts’s loss
of coastline and the EPA’s inaction in Massachusetts v. EPA, the State had demonstrated a
financial injury caused by federal agency action. Id. at 159 (“Texas is entitled to the same
‘special solicitude’ as was Massachusetts, and the causal link is even closer here.”).
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quasi-sovereign interests alone, perhaps proprietary interests can “push them
over the standing barrier, even if those proprietary interests are insufficient
on their own.”136  After all, if the whole point of standing analysis is to ensure
concrete adversity, then “what sense could it make to say that categorically
distinct interests cannot be additive”?137
Another possibility, however, is that standing analysis is and should be
about more than concrete adversity.  In particular, as Professor Richard Fal-
lon has argued, “the Justices should recognize that disputed standing ques-
tions are frequently enmeshed with concerns about the proprietary of
particular kinds of remedies.”138  Much of the separation of powers and legit-
imacy concerns about state standing to sue the federal government arise
from the availability of nationwide relief at preliminary stages of the litiga-
tion.  Critics of nationwide injunctions have pointed to state litigation as a
primary example of the problem: states may shop for favorable forums and
obtain nationwide preliminary relief in politically controversial cases based
upon a limited factual record.139  The scope of state standing may be bound
up with the nature of the relief the state seeks.
The recent Emoluments Clause litigation nicely illustrates these pieces
of the puzzle of state standing.  In District of Columbia v. Trump, Maryland and
the District of Columbia sued President Trump for alleged violations of the
Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses.140  As is typical in modern state
standing cases, the plaintiffs alleged not only proprietary, but also sovereign
and quasi-sovereign interests as the bases for standing.  Their proprietary
injuries arose from their financial interests in hotels that compete with the
Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C.141  Their sovereign and
quasi-sovereign interests, by contrast, encompassed harms to their opportu-
nity to participate in national political processes, which had been diluted by
the President’s alleged acceptance of prohibited emoluments.142  The dis-
trict court distinguished among the plaintiffs’ interests because their proprie-
tary interests concerned the acceptance of prohibited emoluments through
the operations of the Trump International Hotel while their sovereign and
quasi-sovereign interests were not so limited.143  For instance, the plaintiffs’
proprietary interests, which the Court held sufficed for standing purposes
136 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 29, at 398 (“[P]roprietary interests can top off quasi-
sovereign interests or push them over the standing barrier, even if those proprietary inter-
ests are insufficient on their own to support standing.”); see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007).
137 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 29, at 399.
138 Fallon, supra note 31, at 1110.
139 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 418–19 (2017).
140 District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018).  I participated as
an amicus in support of the plaintiffs in this litigation.
141 See id. at 735.
142 See id. at 741.
143 See id. at 738.
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under the traditional Article III analysis, did not support standing to chal-
lenge the operations of the Trump Organization outside D.C.144
* * *
Each of the pieces of the puzzle of state standing—how to define propri-
etary interests, whether they are due special solicitude (or special disfavor),
and whether to add them to other state interests in order to find standing—
arose in Texas v. United States and in District of Columbia v. Trump, as they do in
many other cases of state litigation against the federal government.  This puz-
zle can present difficult and contested questions about Article III, the separa-
tion of powers, federalism, and the appropriate scope of judicial remedies.
These hard questions about state standing need not and should not be
addressed in every case that raises them, as Part III argues.
III. AN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR STATE STANDING
This Part offers this Essay’s second contribution to state standing analy-
sis.  It prescribes an order of battle for resolution of disputes about state
standing.  The starting point of analysis should be whether the state has
standing under the typical Article III and prudential rules that apply to pri-
vate parties.  If a state would have standing under the typical rules applicable
to private parties, then the only question is whether there is some reason to
show special disfavor to the state.  Courts should address questions about spe-
cial solicitude only in those cases where a state would lack standing under the
rules applicable to private parties.
How should courts apply the typical standing rules, given the difficulties
of applying the private rights model to states?  The framework in this Part
does not eliminate every hard question.  But it clarifies the analytical and
doctrinal choices that courts must make.  To bring greater analytical clarity,
this Part proposes that courts look to the merits of the dispute and the relief
the state seeks and ask whether a state is seeking to enforce its own rights or
the rights of a third party and whether the rights it is seeking to enforce are
private rights or public rights.  This Part first argues that considering the
underlying merits and claims for relief can clarify state standing analysis.  It
then distinguishes among four types of rights claims that states might bring.
Against this backdrop, this Part describes the order of battle it proposes, and
concludes by considering objections to this proposal.
A. Private Rights and Public Rights in State Standing Cases
My proposal takes as a premise that standing determinations are inevita-
bly bound up with the merits.  Whether a plaintiff has standing should be
determined by reference to the underlying law the plaintiff seeks to enforce.
In the most influential statement of this view, then-Professor William Fletcher
argued that the standing analysis should ask, “[d]oes the plaintiff have a legal
144 See id. at 753.
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right to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty?”145  While the Court
has not adopted this approach to standing, standing is nevertheless inextrica-
bly linked to the merits, as Fallon has explained: “Try as the Supreme Court
might to conceptualize standing as injury in fact, its decisions reveal that
whether a plaintiff has suffered a judicially cognizable injury . . . frequently
turns on the provision of law under which a plaintiff seeks relief.”146  Profes-
sors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have argued that federal courts
would do well to acknowledge as much when it comes to state standing.147
This premise helps address the analytical challenge of applying the pri-
vate rights model of standing to states.  In particular, by looking to the under-
lying substantive law we may determine whether the state is seeking to
enforce its own rights or the rights of a third party and whether the rights it is
seeking to enforce are private rights or public rights.148
My proposal also takes as a premise that standing analysis bears upon,
and is often bound up with, remedial questions.  As Fallon has noted, while
“[s]tanding issues rarely emerge in suits for damages,” they occur often “in
suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.”149  The Court has sometimes made
this link between justiciability and remedies explicit.150  And, as Part II’s dis-
cussion of District of Columbia v. Trump highlighted, questions of the scope of
state standing are linked to the scope of available relief.151
The Snapp Court’s distinctions among “proprietary,” “sovereign,” and
“quasi-sovereign” interests sometimes muddle different sorts of claims for
relief.  Consider, for example, the category of quasi-sovereign interests,
which, as Snapp and its progeny have defined it, conflate public rights claims
for injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance with private rights claims for
compensatory damages.  For instance, in Missouri v. Illinois, one State sought
to enjoin another from polluting interstate waters not based upon “direct
property rights belonging to the complainant State,” but instead based upon
the threat to the public health and welfare, which is a classic public rights
claim.152  By contrast, in New York ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Medical Group,
P.C., a federal court held that a state had quasi-sovereign standing to sue a
145 Fletcher, supra note 31, at 229.
146 Fallon, supra note 31, at 1071.
147 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 505–07 (noting that “[m]any thoughtful
proposals in the area of individual standing have suggested a revival of the legally-pro-
tected-interest inquiry” and arguing that this inquiry would help rationalize state standing
law).
148 This Section draws upon the framework developed in my prior work on state stand-
ing, particularly the arguments in Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at
17–22, and Davis, State Action Problem, supra note 9, at 595–96, 625–37.
149 Fallon, supra note 31, at 1110.
150 See id. at 1111 n.282 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)) (noting
that questions about whether plaintiff has alleged judicially cognizable injury “obviously
shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable
relief”).
151 See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
152 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
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professional corporation for compensatory damages for allegedly discrimi-
nating against an individual in violation of federal laws protecting individuals
with disabilities.153  Attending to the rights at stake and the forms of relief
involved helps distinguish these two cases and, in turn, clarifies the compari-
sons between state standing and private standing we should draw in the
standing analysis.
Confusion among different types of rights and claims for relief can also
arise within the “proprietary” category of cases under the Snapp framework.
Consider again Brackeen v. Zinke, in which several States sued to enjoin imple-
mentation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).154  ICWA provides mini-
mum federal standards to protect the best interests of Indian children in
child custody proceedings in state court.155  The States alleged that compli-
ance with ICWA, which creates preemptive federal law applicable in state
courts, would impose financial costs on them.156  Are such costs “proprietary”
injuries that suffice for state standing to sue the federal government?  There
is lower court authority that suggests states may premise Article III standing
upon this basis, as long as the state specifically alleges that the challenged
federal action directly caused a particular amount of financial cost.157  Yet
attention to the underlying rights claims in Brackeen suggests that if the cate-
gory of “proprietary” standing stretches this far, there is little need for states
to point to “sovereign” or “quasi-sovereign” interests when suing the federal
government.  The States sought to litigate a claim arising under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which
was a private rights claim; an anticommandeering claim based upon the
Tenth Amendment, which involved a public right held by states; and a claim
under the nondelegation doctrine, which, at least on the facts of Brackeen,
did not involve a right held by states.158  The possibility of state standing to
153 See New York ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143, 149
(1995).  The State also sought injunctive relief to benefit “all current and future deaf
patients and their families,” and thus its suit had a “broader scope than the denial” of one
individual’s private rights. Id. The court’s failure to distinguish among the rights at stake
and the forms of relief underscores this Essay’s point that more careful attention is needed
to the ways in which state standing relates to the underlying merits and the relief the state
requests.
154 See Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018). See generally Indian
Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
155 See 25 U.S.C. § 1902; Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System, 81
Fed. Reg. 90,524, 90,527 (Dec. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1355) (“[S]ome
states, tribes, national organizations and federal agencies have stated that ICWA is the
‘gold standard’ of child welfare practice . . . .”).
156 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 107, at 6–8, 13, 60; Brackeen, 338 F. Supp.
3d at 527.
157 See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (“[T]he expen-
diture of state funds may qualify as an invasion of a legally protected interest sufficient to
establish standing under the proper circumstances.”), aff’d sub nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783
F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015).
158 Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 520.
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sue the federal government for any and all of these types of claims raises
Article III and separation of powers questions that are more complex than
the “proprietary” label might suggest.
B. Four Categories of Cases
Drawing distinctions among the underlying rights and claims for relief
clarifies the ways in which we might compare the standing of states to the
standing of private parties.  In particular, we might distinguish between pri-
vate rights and public rights and between cases in which a state seeks to
enforce its own rights and those in which it seeks to enforce the rights of a
third party.
Doing so yields four categories of cases.  First, a state may sue to vindi-
cate its own private rights.  Second, a state may sue to vindicate its own public
rights.  Third, a state may sue to vindicate a third party’s private rights.
Fourth, and finally, a state may sue to vindicate public rights that are not its
own.
1. A State’s Private Rights
The idea that public governments have “private” rights may seem
oxymoronic.  In an important sense, of course, everything that a public gov-
ernment does is—or at least should be—public regarding.  And we might
sensibly refer to all rights held by states as “public” rights.  Indeed, while we
might today think of a government’s “proprietary” rights as indistinguishable
from a private owner’s rights,159 historically the category of public rights
included “proprietary rights held by government on behalf of the people.”160
But the sense in which I use “private rights” here is not oxymoronic.161
159 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982) (comparing a state’s “proprietary interests” to those of “other associations and pri-
vate parties” and reasoning that “like other such proprietors it may at times need to pursue
those interests in court”).
160 Nelson, supra note 11, at 566.
161 There is an extensive literature on the distinction between “private rights” and
“public rights” in Article III jurisprudence generally and in standing law in particular. See,
e.g., Baude, supra note 4, at 198 (discussing distinction between public rights and private
rights in standing doctrine); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v.
Marshall, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 195 (arguing that rationales for public rights exception
to requirement of Article III adjudication “are open to question”); Nelson, supra note 11,
at 566 (arguing that any understanding of the requirement of Article III adjudication must
take into account “traditional taxonomy” of private rights versus public rights); Woolhan-
dler & Nelson, supra note 5, at 694 (referring to “the ubiquity of the twin ideas of public
control over public rights and private control over private rights”).  And, of course, there
are reasonable debates about the proper definition of this distinction in terms of doctrine
and history.  My aim is to bracket those debates, as well as the debates about whether
Article III mandates a private rights model of standing, and instead to clarify the compari-
son between private standing and state standing under the current doctrines that apply
when private parties sue in federal court.
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Instead, I mean to refine the cluster of ideas that courts and commenta-
tors have invoked to define a state’s “proprietary” interests.  As we have seen,
the idea of “ownership” may, if pitched at the right level of generality,
encompass state interests that private parties do not share under substantive
law.  Under the common law, a state shares some causes of action with private
parties, but also has uniquely public rights as well.  To be sure, a state may
have “private law” interests that are indistinguishable from those of private
parties.  But public law may also afford a state rights on the same terms as it
affords them to private parties.  Like private parties, states may have financial
interests, but such interests may arise from legal rights (and powers) that
states alone enjoy.  The distinction between a state’s “corporate” interests
and its “governmental” interests helps make this last point, and may be clari-
fied by looking to the underlying substantive law the states seeks to enforce.
A state seeks to litigate its own “private” rights when it invokes a personal
right that it shares with private parties under a law that benefits both on the
same terms.  Personal rights held by individuals are private rights.162  They
may be held under the common law, statutes, or the Constitution.163  And
they may be held against private parties or government actors.  As legal per-
sons, states may also enjoy personal rights.  In some cases, they will enjoy
these rights under generally applicable laws that also benefit private parties.
It is a familiar feature of our federalism that generally applicable laws
may reach states and private parties.  In some cases, such laws may impose
duties on states and private parties alike.  The Court’s Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence has grappled with the constitutionality of such generally appli-
cable duties.164  Substantive law may also recognize generally applicable
rights.  The common law, for example, provides personal causes of action
that protect any legal person that holds title to property.  But there is no a
priori reason to define a state’s private rights to include only common-law
causes of action.  Where a state is “one of the class for whose especial benefit
[a] statute was enacted,”165 the state may have standing on the same terms as
a private member of that class would.166
162 See Hessick, supra note 44, at 280 (“[P]rivate rights are those rights held by
individuals.”).
163 See id. at 287–88.
164 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (citing, among others,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)) (noting that many
“recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority of Con-
gress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws”).
165 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
166 In such a case, the Court’s elimination of the “zone-of-interests” test for prudential
standing points toward a careful analysis to determine if the provision of law the state seeks
to enforce “encompasses” its claim. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014).
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2. A State’s Public Rights
Of course, states and private parties might enjoy different rights under
the same substantive body of law.  In public rights cases, a state may allege a
violation of rights it holds, but which are not enjoyed by a class of benefi-
ciaries that includes private parties, or which do not benefit the state on the
same terms as private parties.  A state seeks to invoke its own public rights
when it sues to vindicate a right that benefits states as states.
For example, the rights, if any, that states enjoy under the Constitution
may not be shared with private parties and may differ from constitutional
rights that private parties enjoy.  Consider the Tenth Amendment’s structural
protections for states.  A private party may invoke these structural protec-
tions, at least as a defense to criminal prosecution under a federal statute, in
order to protect her individual liberty.167  The potential analogy between the
private rights of an individual and the Tenth Amendment rights of a state
may help explain why standing has not seemed controversial when a state
brings a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering or anticoercion claim.
When New York sued the United States on an anticommandeering theory,
for example, the Court did not so much as glance at standing,168 even
though it had reasoned seven years earlier that federalism claims presented
questions better addressed to Congress.169  Perhaps we should see a state’s
anticommandeering claim no differently than we see a private litigant’s chal-
lenge to government action that infringes her liberty.
This analogy breaks down upon inspection, however.170  To be sure,
“[t]he States of the Union ‘derive important benefits’ from the Constitu-
tion[,] [ ]such as protection against invasion, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4,”171 the
Tenth Amendment protections against commandeering and coercion,172
and the principle of equal sovereignty,173 to name three that the courts have
recognized.  These public rights do not, however, benefit states on the same
terms as private parties, who, for instance, may invoke the Tenth Amend-
ment as a defense to criminal prosecution because due process prohibits a
criminal conviction premised upon an invalid law.174  To the extent it affords
167 See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220 (2011) (“The individual, in a proper
case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that feder-
alism defines.”).
168 See New York, 505 U.S. 144.
169 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (“The political process ensures that laws that unduly
burden the States will not be promulgated.”).
170 See Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 77 (arguing that analogy
between anticommandeering right and individual liberty breaks down).
171 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Price v. Social-
ist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
172 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); New York, 505 U.S.
144.
173 See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
174 See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 226 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(explaining that criminal defendant “has a personal right not to be convicted under a
constitutionally invalid law”).
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states any judicially enforceable rights, the Tenth Amendment does not do so
on the same terms as it protects criminal defendants.175
3. A Third Party’s Private Rights
The third category of cases has been obscured in cases and commentary
on “quasi-sovereign” interests.  Some such cases, as Snapp defined the cate-
gory, involve a state’s public rights.  For example, Snapp stated, “a State has a
quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status
within the federal system.”176  When a state seeks to vindicate its “equal sover-
eignty” under the Constitution,177 it brings this sort of public rights claim.
Other cases, however, involve enforcement of a third party’s private
rights.178  One example arises from the recent travel ban litigation.179  When
two states challenged the Trump Administration’s first ban on travel from
majority-Muslim countries, the Ninth Circuit held that they had third-party
standing to litigate individual constitutional rights claims under the rules
applicable to private parties, but did not premise state standing on quasi-
sovereign interests.180
4. Public Rights Not Held by States
Finally, there are some cases in which a state sues to vindicate a public
right, but not one that it holds as a state.  A “public right,” recall, involves
“duties owed ‘to the whole community, considered as a community, in its
social aggregate capacity.’”181  The public interest in compliance with the law
is one example.
There are public rights under federal law that are not held by states.  In
general, states do not hold the public right to sue to ensure compliance with
federal law—they are not empowered, in Judge Diana Motz’s felicitous
175 There are reasonable debates to be had about whether, and if so, to what extent the
Constitution affords states judicially enforceable rights. Compare Woolhandler, supra note
9, at 224–25 (questioning whether “governments have the primary interests in litigating
structural claims”), with Huq, supra note 9, at 1515 (arguing that governments, such as
states, should have primary authority to vindicate structural claims).  When it comes to due
process, however, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he word ‘person’ in the con-
text of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of
interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union.”  South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).
176 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
177 See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544 (holding that section 4 of the Voting Rights Act
violated “equal sovereignty” of states).
178 For further discussion of the “quasi-sovereign” category of cases and the distinction
between private rights and public rights, see Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note
9, at 23–24, and Davis, State Action Problem, supra note 10, at 631–32 & n.294.
179 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
180 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
181 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quot-
ing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41).
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phrase, to roam as a “roving constitutional watchdog.”182  More specifically,
Mellon rejected the claim that a state has a public right to enforce the federal
government’s duties to individual citizens.183  The Court has also questioned
whether the federal separation of powers creates rights for states as states.184
Public rights held by (or on behalf of) American Indian Nations are yet
another example of public rights held under federal law, but not by states.185
C. The Order of Battle
Of course, there are reasonable debates about how to define private
rights versus public rights, and the distinction between private rights and
public rights cannot itself determine the answers to difficult questions of
state standing.  The previous Sections have argued simply that the distinction
between private rights and public rights, and between first-party claims and
third-party claims, is more precise than the Snapp Court’s distinctions among
“proprietary,” “sovereign,” and “quasi-sovereign” interests.  Focusing upon
the rights the state invokes in its claims for relief helps clarify the analytical
and doctrinal stakes.  In particular, it helps clarify the comparisons we might
draw between the standing of states and the standing of private parties.
This Section offers an order of battle for making these comparisons.
The starting point of analysis should be whether the state has standing under
the Article III and prudential rules applicable to private parties.  If it would,
then the only question is whether there is some reason to show special disfa-
vor to the state.  If the state would lack standing under the typical rules, then
courts should address whether the state is due special solicitude.
This approach was not the approach that the Supreme Court took in
Massachusetts v. EPA.186  Nor is it the approach that many lower federal
courts have taken since that case,187 with important exceptions.188  This Sec-
tion sketches how the proposed order of battle would clarify comparisons
between states and private parties in the standing analysis.
182 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
183 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (concluding that “it is no part
of [a state’s] duty or power to enforce [the] rights [of its citizens] in respect of their
relations with the federal government”).
184 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966) (“[C]ourts have con-
sistently regarded . . . the principle of the separation of powers only as protection[ ] for
individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial
determinations of guilt.”). But cf. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (“[F]ederal action that violates the Constitu-
tion’s separation of powers may also ‘invade[ ] rights which . . . are reserved by the Consti-
tution to the several states.’” (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938))).
185 See generally Davis, State Action Problem, supra note 9, at 634–35.
186 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007).
187 See Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
188 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159–61 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
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1. Does the State Have Standing Under the Article III and Prudential
Rules Applicable to Private Parties?
Insofar as private litigants typically have standing to litigate their own
private rights, the first question in state standing cases typically should be
whether the state has standing to obtain the relief it seeks based upon its
private rights.  Application of the typical Article III and prudential rules
should be most straightforward in cases where states sue to vindicate a per-
sonal right that private parties also may sue to vindicate.  If the state has
standing to seek redress for its private rights, then there is no need for a
federal court to consider whether it is due special solicitude based upon a
unique “sovereign” or “quasi-sovereign” interest.  The only question would be
whether the state is due special disfavor in the standing analysis.
Assessment of a state’s public rights under the typical rules is a slightly
harder question, at least conceptually.  The typical standing rules limit a pri-
vate litigant’s standing to vindicate public rights.  For instance, a private liti-
gant cannot sue to enforce the Tenth Amendment based upon nothing more
than an ideological interest in federalism.  Such a litigant lacks an injury in
fact.  There has not been, however, any controversy when a state sues in
anticommandeering and anticoercion cases to enforce its public right under
the Tenth Amendment.  We might see a state’s standing to sue to vindicate
this public right as a case of special solicitude with respect to the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.  Conversely, such a case might be better conceptu-
alized as an application of the typical Article III injury-in-fact requirement to
a state’s claim of a public right.
Either way, there are a class of public rights cases brought by states
where the typical rules apply straightforwardly.  In these cases, such as New
York v. United States,189 a state will be able to fulfill the typical causation and
redressability requirements, as well as the typical prudential requirements,
and, at most, will be due a kind of “special solicitude” in the injury-in-fact
analysis, but only insofar as private parties do not have standing to vindicate
public rights as a matter of course.  Where a state raises such a claim of pub-
lic right, the most straightforward course may be for courts to analyze stand-
ing on this basis first.
The analysis of third-party standing will typically be more difficult than
the analysis of first-party standing.  In recent work, I have argued that states
should have standing to litigate a third party’s private rights when they can
demonstrate an Article III injury in fact and satisfy the typical prudential
requirements for third-party standing.190  Where a state has standing under
these typical rules, the only question should be whether the state is due spe-
cial disfavor.
189 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
190 See Davis, supra note 48, at 171.  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Washington v. Trump
is a model of analysis where a state premises standing upon a third party’s private rights.
See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1159–61 & n.5.
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Where a state sues to vindicate a public right not its own, it may have
standing on the same basis as a private party would.  A state might sue under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for example, to enforce the consti-
tutional separation of powers, the APA’s procedural requirements, or some
statutory limit on the agency’s discretion.191  Such claims may involve public
rights that are not the state’s own.  When a state brings such a suit, the first
question is whether a private party raising the same claims would have stand-
ing to sue.
2. If So, Then Is There a Reason to Show the States Special Disfavor in
the Standing Analysis?
The cases and commentary have focused upon whether states are due
special solicitude in the standing analysis.  But, as I have explored in recent
work, there is also the possibility that states should be due special disfavor in
the standing analysis.192  Here, I want to highlight how the proposed order of
battle sheds light on a doctrinal problem that usually is ignored in the cases
on a state’s parens patriae standing.
It is not clear how to compare the third-party standing of private litigants
with the standing of states to vindicate a third party’s private rights.  The
Court’s third-party standing jurisprudence suggests reasons for concern
about state standing to vindicate another’s private rights.  For one, “third
parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights.”193
For another, “it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not
wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the
in-court litigant is successful or not.”194  Moreover, Snapp stated that a state
“must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private par-
ties” in order to maintain a parens patriae action.195  And, finally, Mellon held
that a state lacks parens patriae standing to espouse its citizens’ individual con-
stitutional rights against the federal government.196
Perhaps a state is due special disfavor when it seeks to vindicate a third
party’s private rights.  For instance, perhaps a state should not be able to avail
itself of the typical standing rules that allow a private party sometimes to sue
based upon a third party’s private rights.  Instead, a state might be required
to fulfill the unique rules that apply to parens patriae standing whenever it
191 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 152 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
192 In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice John Roberts raised
this possibility when it came to the “quasi-sovereign” standing of states. See Massachusetts,
549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  I will not rehearse here the arguments for and
against special disfavor for states, which I explore at length in Davis, supra note 25, at
1269–82, and which I have noted in Davis, supra note 48, at 183.
193 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976).
194 See id. at 113–14.
195 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
196 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). But cf. Davis, supra note 25,
at 1300–01 (arguing that Mellon is a prudential, not a constitutional, bar).
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seeks to bring such a claim.  And, in turn, those rules that might be under-
stood to create “an additional hurdle for a state litigant” in the Article III
analysis.197
The important point for this Essay is that the proposed order of battle
would require courts to confront this sort of question.  Too much attention
has been paid to the problem of special solicitude when some cases instead
are best understood to raise the possibility of special disfavor.
3. If No, Then Is There a Reason to Show the States Special Solicitude in
the Standing Analysis?
Although federal courts raise the question of special solicitude more
often than they should, there are cases in which it cannot be avoided.  Both
Massachusetts v. EPA198 and Texas v. United States199 were cases in which the
question of special solicitude necessarily arose with respect to the causation
and redressability requirements of Article III.  If courts were to employ the
order of battle proposed here, I suspect that it might focus greater attention
on how (and why) special solicitude might be afforded to states with respect
to causation and redressability.
Courts might, of course, afford special solicitude to states with respect to
the constitutional injury in fact requirement.  Permitting states to litigate
their own public rights, without any further showing of an injury in fact,
might be understood as a form of special solicitude for states, insofar as pri-
vate parties may not be able to show an injury in fact when they seek to liti-
gate a public right.  But permitting such suits might instead be seen as an
application of the typical requirements for standing:  Just as the violation of a
private party’s own rights typically suffices to make out an injury in fact, so
too does the violation of a state’s own rights.200
Courts might, however, afford states special solicitude with respect to the
injury in fact requirement by allowing states to aggregate their injuries in
order to make out standing to sue.  As Part II argued, to the extent that
standing and remedial questions are intertwined, this sort of aggregation
muddles the analysis.  But there are cases in which a kind of aggregation
197 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).  A complete analysis of the comparison between a state and private
parties in third-party cases would also look to the rules concerning the standing of private
organizations as a potential point of comparison.  For further discussion of this compari-
son, see Davis, State Action Problem, supra note 9, at 602 (discussing “a perplexing series of
cases involving state actors as private organizations”).
198 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524–25.
199 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 160 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Davis, supra note 25, at 1248–49 (discussing
appropriate role that special solicitude played in standing analysis in Texas v. United States).
200 Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Our contemporary decisions have not required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury
beyond the violation of his personal legal rights to satisfy the ‘injury-in-fact’
requirement.”).
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makes sense.  In Texas v. United States, for example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the State of Texas had standing based upon the financial costs of provid-
ing driver’s licenses to DAPA recipients, even though the United States
argued that any such injury was self-inflicted because the State could simply
alter its driver’s license regime.201  The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument,
and rightly so: a state has an interest in its “power to create and enforce a
legal code.”202  Given the “direct, substantial pressure directed” at Texas to
alter its driver’s license rules,203 the court of appeals afforded “special solici-
tude” to the State.204
Courts might also afford special solicitude with respect to prudential
standing requirements, particularly the limits on third-party standing.  For
example, current law permitting states to sue as parens patriae representatives
allows for suits that a private party invoking third-party standing almost cer-
tainly could not have brought.205
Special solicitude, whether of the constitutional or prudential variety,
raises difficult questions that courts need not address where a state has stand-
ing to obtain the relief it seeks on the same terms as a private party might.
Not every puzzle of state standing needs to be solved in every case.
D. Objections
The primary benefit of this proposal is the way in which it clarifies analyt-
ical and doctrinal questions in state standing cases.  In addition, the proposal
may serve as a soft limit on the expansion of state standing and the fragmen-
tation of standing doctrine.  Critics of expansive state standing have argued
that state litigation, particularly against the federal government, raises separa-
tion of powers concerns and threatens to crowd out private enforcement.206
Scholars have also pointed to the decision costs of complexity that arise from
the fragmentation of standing doctrine, including the fragmentation
between state standing and private standing.207  By directing courts first to
consider whether a state has standing under the rules applicable to private
201 See Texas, 809 F.3d at 157.
202 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
203 Texas, 809 F.3d at 154.
204 See id.  Under the framework here, which ties standing and remedial questions
together, if standing was based upon this aggregation of financial injuries and sovereign
interests, the injunction in Texas v. United States should not have been a nationwide injunc-
tion.  Instead, it should have been limited to ensuring that Texas did not suffer the finan-
cial loss of subsidizing driver’s licenses for DAPA recipients. See Davis, supra note 25, at
1302.
205 Snapp itself, in which Puerto Rico sued on behalf of hundreds of Puerto Rican work-
ers under statutes that did not clearly create private rights of action, may have been such a
suit. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 368; Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, supra note 9, at 44
(“The [Snapp] Court held that Puerto Rico could sue to enforce federal labor and immi-
gration laws on behalf of its citizens without asking whether Congress intended private
enforcement . . . .”).
206 See supra Section I.C.
207 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 31, at 1092.
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parties, the proposal mitigates the potential problems of expansion and
fragmentation.
There are, however, several objections to the proposal, which this final
Section outlines.
1. Loss of Legal Development
One objection is that the proposed order of battle will lead to an unac-
ceptable loss of development of the law of state standing.  In particular, the
concern may be that the law of “sovereign” and “quasi-sovereign” interests,
which is already uncertain, will tend to remain uncertain as a result of the
proposal that courts first ask if the state has raised a private right that suffices
for standing under the typical rules.  My proposal, in short, disrupts the
development of a body of law that needs more developing.
A similar concern has arisen in the qualified immunity context.  There,
the Supreme Court has counseled that merits-first adjudication “promotes
the development of constitutional precedent,” while still concluding that fed-
eral courts should have discretion to decide that a defendant enjoys qualified
immunity without deciding whether a constitutional right has been vio-
lated.208  While concerns about the loss of legal development may be decisive
in debates about qualified immunity, where the development of substantive
constitutional law is at stake, that type of concern is not decisive here, where
the development of threshold jurisdictional law is at issue.
2. The Simplicity of Special Solicitude (in Some Cases)
A second objection is that the proposed order of battle would not sim-
plify state standing analysis.  This Part has already addressed the strong ver-
sion of this objection, which is that looking to the merits and the state’s
claims for relief to ground the comparison between states and private parties
does not clarify the problem.
A weaker version of this objection is that in some cases it may be simpler
to decide that the state has standing by invoking special solicitude.  In some
cases, the law concerning state standing may be settled where the law con-
cerning private standing is not.  The Tenth Amendment provides a ready
example: long before the Court decided in 2011 that private parties may sue
under the Tenth Amendment in some cases, it was clear that states had some
legally cognizable claims under the Tenth Amendment.209
The proposed order of battle is not meant as an absolute mandate, how-
ever.  Where the law of state standing is settled, a comparison with the law
concerning private standing may be unnecessary.  In particular, this sort of
concern is likely to arise with respect to the injury-in-fact requirement.  Some
injuries to states’ public rights are clearly cognizable under current standing
law.  As discussed above, recognizing state standing to vindicate a state’s own
208 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
209 Compare Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011), with New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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public rights, as in the anticommandeering cases, might be seen as “special
solicitude” for the states.  Insofar as that is true, my proposal would not man-
date that a federal court conduct an extensive comparison of private injuries
with those suffered by states.
3. The Virtues of Fragmentation
A third objection is more troubling, but not decisive.  This objection is
that fragmentation in standing analysis is to be welcomed.  The concern that
is most relevant here is that federal courts might manipulate the typical rules
of standing when applying them to state litigation in ways that will warp the
law of private standing.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, Chief Justice
John Roberts’s dissenting opinion criticized the Court’s “relaxation” of the
typical Article III requirements while taking solace in the fact that the Court
seemed to limit this relaxed approach to states.210
The aim of the proposal is not to invite manipulation of the typical
standing rules.  To the contrary, the proposal aims to avoid the sort of ambi-
guity on display in the majority’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, where it was
unclear to what extent the Court was fragmenting the doctrine of state stand-
ing from the doctrine of private standing.  If manipulation of the typical rules
is required to find that the state has standing, then a court should instead
turn to consider whether special solicitude is warranted.
In addition, because the proposed order of battle is presumptive only, a
court that is concerned about resolving an untested question of private stand-
ing can avoid the question by invoking special rules applicable to states.
Application of the proposed order of battle might create a risk that courts
would systematically tend to hold that (i) a private litigant in the state’s posi-
tion would not have standing, but, nevertheless, (ii) the state has standing
based upon special solicitude.  In other words, perhaps courts would shrink
the scope of private standing in the course of deciding whether states have
standing.  To the extent that the concern is that courts would intentionally
manipulate the order of battle to shrink private standing, the simple
response is that there are far more private standing cases than state standing
cases out there, and therefore the proposal would not significantly increase
the opportunity for intentional, bad-faith judging.  Another concern would
be that the proposal would systematically bias courts against private standing
and in favor of state standing.  But because the proposal treats private stand-
ing as the baseline for standing analysis, there seems little reason to assume
that it would result in a bias against private litigation.  While my proposal may
lead courts to explain more often why special solicitude for states was neces-
sary to the standing holding, it does not necessarily follow that their opinions
will reduce the existing availability of private standing to sue in federal court.
210 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 548 (2007).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has aimed to bring greater clarity to state standing law’s com-
parison of state standing with private standing.  It has argued that the starting
point of analysis for state standing in any particular case should be whether
the state would have standing under the rules applicable to private parties.
And insofar as current private standing doctrine starts with the private rights
of private litigants, so too should state standing doctrine start with the private
rights of public governments.
